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Causal Production as Interaction 
R.D. Ingthorsson 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of causal production lies at the heart of the common conception of the nature of 
causality, i.e. the belief that causes bring their effects into existence. But, in philosophy, there 
is controversy regarding the nature of this alleged production. Not only is there controversy 
regarding its nature, but also about its reality. However, in this paper, I will confine my 
discussion to the nature of causal production, on the assumption that it is real.  
Discussions regarding the nature of causal production, like discussions about causality in 
general, usually turn on the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect.1 I will 
however focus as well on the more fundamental question: what is causal production? That is, 
the problem of causal production, as I discern it, revolves around two distinct but interrelated 
questions: (i) what is causal production, and (ii) is there a necessary connection between cause 
and effect? Of course, any answer given to the latter depends partly on how one answers the 
first, because the first gives us the answer to what causes and effects are. In this paper I will 
present what I think is a partly novel answer to these questions. 
A standard picture of causal production has been around at least since Aristotle.2 The 
general idea is that new states of affairs are brought into existence when an already existing 
material substance changes due to an external influence, without which the change would not 
have occurred and the new state of affairs never exist. The kernel of this view comes out 
clearly in the well known slogan ‘whatever comes to be is necessarily born by the action of a 
cause’. Typically, the external influence, or cause, is depicted in terms of an ‘extrinsic motive 
agent’, basically some object possessing causal powers, which acts upon another object, that 
                                                
1 For reference, see Anscombe [1971]. There are accounts of causation that depict the causal 
relation as something a bit weaker than a necessary connection, e.g. probabilistic accounts of 
causation. For an overview on different approaches to causality, see Sosa and Tooley [1993]. 
2 According to Aristotle, causal production requires four ingredients, (i) a material cause, (ii) a 
formal cause, (iii) an efficient cause, and (iv) a final cause (Physics, book II, Ch. 3). The first three 
kinds of causes are included as components in what I call the standard picture (I prefer to use the term 
‘components’ because the term ‘cause’ has come to be used for the efficient cause only). The material 
cause is the substance of the given state of affairs on which the efficient cause acts, and which 
provides the substance out of which the effect is produced. The character of the effect (i.e. its form, as 
opposed to its substance), is determined by the character of the efficient cause and of the given state of 
affairs. These three components are needed to characterise production in the world of inanimate 
material objects while the issue whether the production is done in order to achieve a goal, or a good, is 
only relevant in cases where there are intentional beings involved, acting with a purpose. 
From Metaphysica 3(1): 87-119, 2002.  
 2 
object sometimes referred to by the term ‘patient’. Accordingly, a cause is the action of some 
object upon another object, and an effect  is the change produced in the object acted upon. 
The standard picture depicts causal production as essentially involving three components: 
(i) that it requires a substance which can be altered, (ii) that the alteration is initiated by some 
influence external to the altering substance, and (iii) that the character of the alteration is 
determined  by the form of the given substance and of the efficient cause. These three 
components relate to three basic metaphysical convictions about coming into existence in 
physical reality. The first of these principles is the old materialistic principle that nothing 
comes into being out of nothing or passes into nothing, the genetic principle for short, since it 
says that everything has a natural origin. The second is the conviction that a distinguishing 
mark of causal changes in the natural world is that they occur as a result of some kind of 
action, basically any kind of influence exerted by one substance upon another, let us call that 
the principle of action. The third is the principle of lawfulness, which says that the world 
changes in a regular way, i.e. according to general laws.3 These principles form the 
metaphysical framework on which the standard picture rests. 
Note that the principle of action does not state that all changes are causal, only that causal 
changes occur as the result of some kind of action. The metaphysical framework of the 
standard picture allows non-causal changes of a certain kind. For instance, if the law of inertia 
is correct, a thing will continue in its motion in the absence of forces, and then a configuration 
of uniformly moving objects may change without the configuration, or the objects, having 
being causally affected. Such change is in accordance with the genetic principle and it is 
lawful, but it is not causal. The standard picture of causal production should therefore not be 
identified with causal determinism, or physicalism, which is the view that no other kinds of 
determination exist than causal determination.4  
It is also important to note that logically speaking these metaphysical principles are 
independent of each other with regard to the idea of coming into existence, i.e. of becoming. 
Everything may be thought to come into being in accordance with the genetic principle, but 
not in a lawful way, nor due to any action, and, it may be thought that something comes into 
being in a lawful way, a way that nevertheless violates the genetic principle and the principle 
of action. That is, it is possible to think that coming into being is always the coming into 
being of something out of something else, but nevertheless that every becoming is unique and 
                                                
3 My account of the ‘standard picture’ owes much to Mario Bunge’s discussion of causality in 
[1959], in particular, Ch. 1. 
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spontaneous, and, it is possible to think of creation ex nihilo by a deity as falling under a 
general law, which is lawful becoming but violates the genetic principle and the principle of 
action. It is even possible to think of substance coming into existence for no reason at all, i.e. 
not out of anything else, not in accordance with any general law, and not because of any kind 
of influence, not even divine will; it is possible to think of becoming as violating all three 
basic principles. Consequently, the idea that nothing comes into being spontaneously out of 
nothing, but always out of something else in a lawful manner, and usually as a result of some 
kind of action, does not derive its appeal from any logical connection between the three basic 
convictions, nor between them and the idea of coming into existence. Its appeal must be 
derived from being confirmed by experience, and/or from its success in explaining 
experience.  
I think it is safe to say that the standard picture and its metaphysical framework is the 
paradigm view of how reality works among laymen in western societies. It is believed that 
things just do not ‘pop’ into existence out of nothing, or alter in a random fashion without 
having been caused to do so. In physics, this view is thought to have its limits. It is thought to 
have considerable empirical support within the realm of classical mechanics, i.e. as applied to 
ordinary middle-sized objects moving at moderate velocities, but its validity is uncertain as 
applied to quantum phenomena.5 Since I am not a physicist, nor a philosopher of physics, I 
am not in a position to discuss causal production on the quantum level, nor for very big, or 
very fast moving objects. Consequently, with respect to physics, my discussion will be 
restricted to the nature of causal production within the realm of classical mechanics. Or, more 
precisely, I will discuss whether an account of causal production can be given that is 
compatible with the metaphysical principles given above, and which makes sense of the 
conviction that there is a necessary connection between that which produces, and the product, 
                                                                                                                                                   
4 For a discussion of different kinds of determination, see Bunge [1959], pp. 6 ff. 
5 I take it to be commonly accepted within physics that although classical mechanics have been 
shown to fail when applied to objects moving at extreme velocities and when applied to the realm of 
micro-particles, then it has been established to hold good for macroscopic objects moving with a speed 
much less than the speed of light. According to what is called the correspondence principle, the 
relativity and quantum theories are more general theories which must yield the same results as 
classical mechanics when applied to the conditions in which the classical theory is known to hold 
good. Consequently, whatever these theories predict about very small and very fast moving entities, 
they ought to predict that ordinary middle-sized objects moving at moderate velocities behave like 
classical mechanics say they do (Weidner & Sells [1968], pp. 13-4; Albert [1992], pp. 43-4). If what I 
will propose is compatible with classical mechanics as applied to the conditions in which they are 
known to hold good, then, according to the correspondence principle, relativity and quantum theories 
should yield the same result within those same conditions.  
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i.e. between cause and effect? I think such an account can be given, with only minor 
modifications of the standard picture. 
Traditionally, it is lawfulness that has been taken to be the important feature of the 
standard picture of causality, and the key to explaining the necessity of the connection 
between cause and effect. The genetic principle is often taken to be an obvious and trivial 
aspect of causal production, a mere boundary condition, despite that it is what above all 
distinguishes natural causation from what might be called supernatural causation, or ‘magic’, 
e.g. production ex nihilo. That is, the cause-effect relation has been considered to be necessary 
in the sense that certain kinds of causes always and invariably produce certain kinds of 
effects, in accordance to a general law of the form ‘if C happens, then (and only then) E is 
always produced by it’. On this account, the necessity is a general feature of causation, 
manifest in type-type relations.  
Surely causation has some general features that can be expressed by general laws, I do not 
dispute that, but, because I think the standard picture is mistaken, I have serious doubts that 
those features have to do with a one-way link between certain types of actions by ‘extrinsic 
motive agents’, and certain types of changes in ‘patients’. However, I will not dwell on the 
problems of general causation. I think it is possible to give a coherent account of how 
something produces something else so that the two are necessarily connected, independently 
of general laws.  
The account comes in two parts. The first part contains an analysis of causal production in 
terms of a certain kind of interaction between things. Briefly, I suggest that causal production 
always involves an interaction between things, and that the causally relevant relationship 
between the interacting entities is in a specific sense symmetrical. In other words, contrary to 
what the standard picture tells us, I suggest that causal production does not just involve an 
action of an ‘agent’ upon a patient, but a mutual and in a certain sense equal action of two 
things upon each other. Further, that this mutual action occurs simultaneously in both 
directions. In other words, I suggest that interactions are thoroughly reciprocal. Consequently, 
I suggest that the conception of cause should be modified to encompass the actions of both 
‘agent’ and ‘patient’ together, i.e. that interactions should count as causes, and that the 
conception of effect be modified to encompass the changes produced in both ‘agent’ and 
‘patient’, when they interact.  
The second part suggest that there is a necessary connection between an interaction and 
the state produced by the interaction, notably a genetic link between token states of affairs, as 
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opposed to a lawful connection between certain types of actions by ‘extrinsic motive agents’, 
and certain types of changes in ‘patients’.  
The idea that the relationship between interacting entities is in a certain sense symmetrical, 
is not new in philosophy, nor in physics. In classical mechanics, it is generally accepted that 
interactions between material bodies are reciprocal, i.e. simultaneous, mutual, and with 
respect to forces quantitatively equal, but not so in philosophy. Among philosophers, Mario 
Bunge and Wesley Salmon, are two of the very few who have taken interaction seriously.  
Bunge argues that the reciprocity of material interactions shows that the dichotomy of 
substances into ‘agents’ and ‘patients’, on which the standard picture depends, is 
ontologically inadequate ([1959], p. 149). He draws the conclusion that the standard picture of 
causality is merely a methodologically useful approximation, but still rejects the idea that 
interaction provides a better account of causality. He rejects interaction because he thinks it 
displays the relationship between cause and effect as being symmetrical and therefore cannot 
possibly involve production of the effect by the cause ([1959], p. 162).  
Salmon, in his attempt to formulate a radically different approach to the problem of 
causality, suggests that an explication of the concepts of production and propagation is the 
key to coming to understand the nature of causality. He suggests that production should be 
explicated in terms of interaction ( [1980]; [1984], Ch. 5-8).  
I think Bunge is wrong to reject interaction as a possible account of causal production, and 
I think more needs to be said about the way interactions involve production than is provided 
by Salmon’s analysis. I think philosophers have been prevented from accepting an interaction-
model of causality, because the term ‘cause’ has since long been restricted to what Aristotle 
called the ‘efficient cause’. That is, causes have come to be considered as essentially 
something external to the changing thing, as if by definition, and that has prevented the thing 
acted upon from being even considered as a part of the cause, or to be more precise, to 
consider the interaction of ‘agent’ and ‘patient’ as being the cause to the effect. I suggest, 
somewhat in the vein of the agency view proposed by F.P. Ramsey [1929], R.G. Collingwood 
[1940], D. Gasking [1955], and G.H. von Wright [1974], that the conception of cause in terms 
of ‘extrinsic motive agent’ is biased by our conception of agency.  
The agency view states that we could not know causality, or could not form the concept of 
causality, unless we knew from ourselves and our actions what it is to act as a cause. The 
agency view might then be taken to claim that the concept of efficient cause is derived from 
our knowledge of ourselves as active agents. This is indeed the view of Evan Fales. Fales 
accepts Hume’s thesis that knowledge of necessity and forces are not given in outer 
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experience, but claims against Hume that knowledge of action and force is given in our inner 
experiences of the effort exercised by our bodies ([1990], pp. 11-14). The question is: to what 
extent does our nature as intentional agents, with all the cognitive capacities we have, 
memory, prediction, etc., bias our view of the objective workings of causality in the world of 
inanimate material objects? Is our conception of ourselves as ‘efficient causes’ really 
applicable to how changes are produced in inanimate material objects by other inanimate 
material objects? I think not, but I also think that it is possible to abstract the component of 
intention from our notion of efficient cause, to derive  a more objective notion.  
Some further comments on my approach to the issue of causality will, I think, be helpful 
to the reader. Firstly, my intention here is not to defend the thesis that causal production is an 
objective feature of reality against those who deny its reality.6 I take the reality for granted. I 
want to present a new analysis of causal production which I think can be given considerable 
empirical support, and which tries to make sense of the idea of a necessary connection 
between causes and their effects. I nevertheless hope that my analysis will be interesting not 
only to those that already agree that there is such a thing as necessary causal production, but 
also to those that have rejected its reality because they have found the standard picture of 
causal production inadequate. I hope they will find reasons to at least reconsider their 
position. 
Secondly, I am not trying to work out a concept of causal production that will encompass 
all logically possible alternatives. That is, I am not arguing that the idea of a deity creating the 
world out of nothing by an act of will is logically incoherent in itself, just as it is not logically 
impossible that things just emerge out of thin air, that fortune tellers really see the future, or 
that telepathy is real. I just do not see that there is any reason to consider such logical 
possibilities in one’s theory of causality. There is no clear empirical evidence to the effect that 
anything has ever been created by an act of divine will, or emerged out of thin air, and even if 
empirical evidence were found to support e.g. creatio ex nihilo by a deity, this would only call 
for a need to distinguish between natural causation and supernatural causation. I argue under 
the assumption that it is the primary role of a metaphysical theory of causality to explain the 
de facto nature of causality as it appears in this world, not of every conceivable world, and 
therefore I restrict the scope of my discussion of causality to production of natural effects by 
                                                
6 For critiques of the Humean view of causality, according to which causation is merely a 
correlation between types of events, see Bunge [1959], Ch. 3, and Armstrong [1983],  part 1. 
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natural causes. Here I find myself to be in perfect agreement with what Sally Haslanger says 
about the relation between metaphysics and rational explanation in [1989]. 
Thirdly, I take myself to be suggesting a crude picture of a novel alternative within the 
realm of classical mechanics, rather than presenting a fully developed theory of causality. 
Therefore, I will not be too much concerned with establishing the universal validity of my 
account. To repeat, since I am not a physicist, nor a philosopher of physics, I cannot discuss 
whether my suggestion is compatible with, or refuted by, relativity and quantum theories of 
physics, which deal respectively with the extremely big and fast moving, and the extremely 
small entities in the universe.  
2. CAUSAL PRODUCTION: A RELATION OR A PROCESS? 
There is a tension between the standard picture of causal production, as I have presented it 
above, and what I take to be the received view in philosophy today, namely the view that 
causation is primarily a relation between temporally distinct events. The standard picture 
depicts the relation between cause and effect as a product of a more fundamental process, the 
action of something on something else. Of course, the standard picture does not deny that 
temporally distinct events are causally related, but it does depict those relations as something 
that comes into being as a result of a more fundamental process, causal production. The 
standard picture is an attempt to reconcile the idea that causality involves a relation between 
two temporally distinct events with the ideas: (i) that the former event brings the latter into 
existence, i.e. produces it in accordance with the genetic principle, and (ii) that this production 
involves some sort of action of something on something else. It is impossible to puzzle these 
ideas together with only a cause, an effect, and a relation between them as components, if 
only for the simple reason that the cause cannot produce the effect by acting on it. If the effect 
only comes into existence by being produced by the cause, i.e. by the action of the ‘efficient 
cause’, the effect cannot be subject to the very same action that is supposed to produce it. This 
would require that the effect already existed when it is acted upon, and could therefore not 
have been produced by that very same action. Some account of what acts upon what is 
required, in order to introduce action into causality, and the cause and effect, construed as ‘the 
event which produces’ and ‘the event produced’ respectively, cannot be those things. So, if 
causation involves production through action of something on something else, the relation 
between cause and effect cannot be the most fundamental aspect of causality. On the standard 
picture, it is the things involved in the events that act upon each other, and thereby produce a 
change, i.e. an effect.  
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The standard picture implicitly depicts the relation between cause and effect as being itself 
a product of causation. The relation only comes into being as a result of the production of the 
effect. On this account, the so-called ‘causal relation’ is not causal in the sense that it is a 
relation that causes anything, but in the sense that it comes into being as a result of causal 
production. This is important, because it implies that the nature of causal production is not 
available by analysis of causal relations, considered as accomplished feats. The relations must 
themselves be considered as ‘products’ of the process to be investigated, and it is the 
investigation of the process that will explain the relation, and not vice versa. The question is, 
what kind of process produces the causal relation by way of producing the relata on the other 
end of the relation? According to the standard picture it is the ‘extrinsic motive agent’ that 
produces the effect by acting on the ‘patient’, i.e. some given state of affairs. 
The peculiar kind of asymmetry involved in the causal relation, when causation is 
assumed to involve production, is not in general recognised by philosophers. Bunge is one 
notable exception. Asymmetrical relations, e.g. larger than, are determined by the 
characteristics of both relata, but the relation between cause and effect, in terms of ‘producer’ 
and ‘product’, is one-sided in the sense that only one of the relata, the cause, is assumed to 
determine the relation between the cause and its effect, by being what brings the other end of 
the relation into existence; the relation comes into existence with the production of the effect. 
The relation between cause and effect is thus asymmetrical, or unidirectional, in the sense that 
the existence of the effect is entirely determined by the cause alone. The effect does not exist 
until the production is finished, and so cannot have any part in the actual producing. We may 
then say that the conception of effects as being brought into existence by a cause implies that 
there is a relation of one-sided existential dependence between cause and effect, i.e. e because 
of c, but not vice versa.7  
3. CAUSAL PRODUCTION AS INTERACTION 
On the macro level, paradigmatic examples of causation involve the action of things upon 
other things, e.g. when a window is broken by being hit by a brick. According to the standard 
picture, it is the action of the brick upon the window that produces the breaking of the 
window. What is meant by ‘action’ requires some comment. Here it is intended to mean 
‘influence exerted by one object upon another’, but this may not conform to all uses of the 
term. Actions of intentional agents are typically composed of a movement of the limbs, 
                                                
7 For an attempt to further explicate the concept of existential dependence, see Eugenie Ginsberg’s 
paper [1931], with an introduction by Peter Simons.  
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performed with the intention to achieve a certain goal, e.g. when a tennis player swings his 
racket to return a ball. We may use the terms ‘striking the ball’ as a description of the whole 
swing. But, the swing is strictly speaking only in part an action upon the ball. It is only when 
the racket comes into contact with the ball that it has any influence on it. We may 
unreflectively think of the whole movement as an action upon the ball, because the swing is 
initiated and guided by the intention to strike the ball. I suspect, that in an unreflective stance 
one may be prone to think of the way inanimate objects act on each other in a similar way, 
e.g. to think of the movement of a brick,  prior to its collision with a window, as a part of its 
‘action’ upon the window. But, of course, prior to actually touching the window, the brick 
exerts no influence upon it.  
Does the brick even act at all prior to its encounter with the window? After all, to be in 
movement is not in itself an action, not if one is to take the law of inertia seriously, which 
says that material bodies continue in their motion in the absence of forces. A moving object, 
unaffected by anything else, continues in its motion without having to ‘do’ anything about it. 
At the very least, that kind of motion is not an action of the moving thing upon any other 
thing. In a sense, non-accelerating motion is really a state, a state of motion. We may say that 
the stone we threw, ‘flies through the air’, as if it was performing a miraculous stunt, but of 
course this is just a figure of speech. So, when considering a brick acting on a window, we 
can only consider as an action the actual influence of the brick upon the window, and that 
influence only begins when they come into contact with each other.  
One should also avoid confusing ‘action’, as used here, with the definition denoted by the 
term ‘action’ in classical mechanics. In mechanics, ‘action’ denotes the time integral of the 
kinetic energy of a material object, as taken between two times. On this account, an action is 
the summation of the  kinetic energy of an object existing at different times, whether that 
object influences anything else or not. This may allow talk of pure motion as an ‘action’, but 
as Heinrich Hertz observed:  
the name ‘action’ for the integral in the text has often been condemned as unsuitable[…] 
these names suggest conceptions which have nothing to do with the objects they denote 
[in mechanics, RI]. It is difficult to see how the summation of the energies existing at 
different times could yield anything else than a quantity for calculation[…] ([1956], p. 
228)  
Let us then return to our example, and point out that whenever a brick hits a window, the 
breaking of the window is not the only change resulting from the interaction. At the same time 
as the window breaks, the brick loses velocity, momentum and kinetic energy; it drops flat to 
the ground. It does this because of the resistance offered by the window, and this resistance is 
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called a ‘reaction’. In fact, whenever anything acts upon anything else, that thing always 
suffers a change in itself, because the thing acted upon always reacts to the action. When a 
brick collides with a window, the window breaks, and the brick loses momentum and 
velocity. In other words, what is often conceived to be an action of one thing upon another 
thing, is really an interaction between the things.  
There are some possible confusions, due to ordinary language use, that must be sorted out 
here. The first is, that sometimes the term ‘interaction’ is used about communication, where 
the communicating entities take turns at affecting each other, e.g. in conversation, or, to use a 
somewhat construed example of communication, when I slap you in the face and you slap 
back. This kind of interaction is not being discussed here. What is being discussed here is the 
collision between hand and face; between brick and window. The second is that sometimes, 
e.g. in the ‘communicative’ situations mentioned, ‘reaction’ is used for the ensuing response 
to some event, e.g. when someone ‘reacts’ to a slap in the face by slapping back. In this use, 
‘reaction’ is used more or less as equivalent to ‘effect’. But, by ‘reaction’ I mean the physical 
resistance immediately offered by a thing when it encounters another thing, e.g. the resistance 
offered by the face being slapped, or by the window being hit by a brick. That is, the breaking 
of the window is not a reaction, in this sense, but an effect; it is the resistance offered by the 
window before it breaks that is a reaction. In the same way, the pain, or humiliation, or anger, 
of being slapped in the face, is not a reaction, but an effect. It is the immediate resistance 
offered by the face to the hand that slapped it, that is a reaction, and this is a reaction that can 
be felt in the hand of the person that did the slapping, and may feel as painful as a slap in the 
face.  
In what follows, the most important points of the argumentation will be presented in the 
form of numbered proposals, for the sake of clarity, at the end of my argumentation for that 
particular point. The argumentation will then continue assuming the truth of that proposal. 
The first proposal will be the lesson already described, and taught by classical mechanics, that 
whenever a material thing acts upon another thing, the thing acted upon reacts to that action:  
P 1: There are no actions without reactions. 
The reaction of the thing acted upon, and the change suffered by the thing acting on it, are 
often neglected in discussions about causality. And yet it has been noted that the fact that 
there is always a reaction seriously threatens the standard picture of causality: 
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 A severe shortcoming of the strict doctrine of causality is that it disregards the fact that 
all known actions are accompanied or followed by reactions, that is, that the effect always 
reacts back on the input unless the latter has ceased to exist […] In other words, the 
polarization of interaction into cause and effect, and the correlative polarization of 
interacting objects into agents and patients, is ontologically inadequate[…] (Bunge 
[1959], pp. 170-1). 
The existence of a reaction undermines the standard picture because it shows that there are no 
strictly passive substances, i.e. substances who only receive influence but do not themselves 
influence other things, nor are there substances who influence other things without being 
themselves affected in any way. It threatens the supposed unidirectionality of actions. 
It is clear that the standard picture needs to be modified in order to include the reaction of 
the ‘patient’, although it is still unclear whether this changes anything much, since it is still 
possible to hold that the reaction is only an effect of the action. That is, even if it is admitted 
that there are no actions without a reaction, then it can be argued that the reaction itself is 
produced, or provoked, by the action, and therefore counts as part of the effect produced by 
the action. Let us be very clear on this modified picture. When a brick collides with a 
window, there is supposed to be an action on behalf of the brick upon the window, a reaction 
on behalf of the window upon the brick, and there are the two changes in the two things: (i) 
the breaking of the window, and (ii) the loss of momentum and velocity by the brick. The 
question is, does the action of the brick, produce the reaction in the window, and so in effect 
produce both the breaking of the window and the loss of momentum and velocity in the brick 
itself?  
The action of the ‘agent’ has been considered to have causal priority mainly for two 
different but interrelated reasons: (i) because it has been assumed that there is a distinction to 
be made between active and passive substances, and (ii) because the action has been thought 
to be temporally prior to the reaction. Now, the first reason partly depends upon the second, at 
least when it has been pointed out that there are no genuinely ‘passive’ substances, i.e. 
substances that merely receive influence, but do not themselves influence other things. 
Ultimately the causal priority of actions over reactions depends on showing that the action is 
in some way temporally prior to the reaction, either because the action begins prior to the 
actual encounter, or because the reaction is temporally retarded in relation to the encounter. 
The first possibility requires us to treat the motion of the ‘agent’, prior to the encounter, as 
part of its action upon the ‘patient’, and this, as I argued above, is to see it acting with a 
purpose, a purpose inanimate objects are incapable of having. Whatever a motion through 
space is, it is something different than the influence exerted by a thing upon another when 
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they encounter one another. The second possibility requires that the thing acted upon initially 
‘gives way’ to the intrusion of the other, without offering any resistance. Perhaps like a rubber 
band initially offers little or no resistance when it is stretched, but successively the resistance 
increases. This way of thinking of the relationship between action and reaction may have 
some appeal when considering a rigid object in motion, colliding with a soft, elastic body at 
rest, but none when considering a soft elastic body in motion colliding with a rigid body at 
rest. In the latter case it is obvious that the resting body resists the moving body from the first 
instant they gain contact with each other. And, on closer inspection, the former example is not 
as convincing as it may first appear to be. In order for the reaction to be temporally retarded, 
it is not enough that it is initially very small, but must be entirely absent, because if the 
reaction is initially very small, so is the action. It requires no large effort to make an 
impression in a  pillow. 
We may perhaps not acquire decisive answers on this issue, by considering common-sense 
examples. What, then, does science tells us about the relationship between action and 
reaction? According to classical mechanics, which is that part of physics that deals with the 
collisions of middle-sized material things, the reaction is always equal to the action, and 
occurs simultaneously in the opposite direction. This relationship is expressed in Newton’s 
third law of motion, which says that the force by which object 1 acts on object 2 is equal to 
the oppositely directed force by which object 2 acts on object 1: 
F1 2 = - F2 1  
Classical mechanics depicts the action and reaction as being thoroughly reciprocal. Action 
and reaction, or force and counterforce, as they are also-called, are reciprocal "in the sense 
that we are free to consider either of them as the force or the counterforce" (Hertz [1956], p. 
185). Now, firstly, if classical mechanics would have found that the reaction was temporally 
retarded in relation to the action, it could not consider them to be reciprocal in this sense. 
Secondly, classical mechanics does not consider interactions as being composed of 
ontologically different kinds of influences, an ‘action’ and a ‘reaction’, of which one kind is 
only a response to the other.  
In mechanics, the terms ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ are indeed considered only to reflect the 
subjective aspect under which the scientist considers the interacting objects, i.e. as depending 
on which changes the scientist is interested in; the changes in the window, or the changes in 
the brick. This point comes out clearly in a passage by Maxwell: 
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The mutual action between two portions of matter receives different names according to 
the aspect under which it is studied, and this aspect depends on the extent of the material 
system which forms the subject of our attention. If we take into account the whole 
phenomenon of the action between the two portions of matter, we call it Stress[…]But 
if[…]we confine our attention to one of the portions of matter, we see, as it were, only 
one side of the transaction—namely, that which affects the portion of matter under our 
consideration—and we call this aspect of the phenomenon, with reference to its effect, an 
External Force acting on that portion of matter. The other aspect of the stress is called the 
Reaction on the other portion of matter ([1877], p. 26-7) 
In classical mechanics, as paraphrased by Bunge, "physical action and reaction are, then, two 
aspects of a single phenomenon of reciprocal action."([1959], p. 153). I will now present as 
the second proposal what classical mechanics takes to be an empirical fact that: 
P 2: Interactions are thoroughly reciprocal. 
Bunge is one of the very few philosophers who have acknowledged the ontological 
significance of the fact that there are no actions without reactions. He takes it to show that the 
standard picture cannot be anything but an approximation of causality, and yet Bunge rejects 
the idea that causality could be explained in terms of interaction, "if only for the simple 
reason that material objects are in a state of flux, so that generally the action has over the 
reaction the definite ‘advantage’—to use an anthropomorphic expression—of priority in 
time."([1959], p. 162) He adds: 
The frequent asymmetry of interactions, as well as the fact that processes in which the 
antecedent disappears altogether cannot be described as interactions (although they 
involve reactions upon different objects), renders interactionism inadequate as a universal 
doctrine. Causation cannot be regarded as a particular case of interaction because the 
latter lacks the essential component of irreversible productivity. ([1959], pp. 170-1) 
To sum up, Bunge has four objections against interaction as a universal doctrine of 
causality: (i) that when we consider the fact that things are in a state of flux, actions are 
temporally prior to the reaction, (ii) that interactions are often so asymmetric that the reaction 
and its effect can be quantitatively neglected, (iii) that some processes, e.g. the spontaneous 
decay of various kinds of micro-particles, cannot be described as interactions, and (iv) that if 
the action does not give rise to the reaction then interaction contains no element of 
productivity, which he, like I, considers an essential component of causality. However, as I 
hope to show, these objections are really directed against a very different conception of 
interaction than the one I present here.  
I will discuss the objections in a different order than they appear above, but begin with the 
first objection that the action is temporally prior to the action. I am afraid that this objection is 
based on a mistake, namely of not separating the reaction from the effect. When talking 
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generally about interaction Bunge says that "the effect always reacts back on the input" 
([1959], p. 170), when discussing gravitational interaction he says that "[e]very change 
produced by m1 on m2 reacts back on m1" ([1959], p. 150), and when discussing the sense in 
which interactions are reciprocal, he only states that there is a reaction to every action, and 
that the reaction is equal to the action, but does not say that they occur simultaneously. In fact, 
he says that every action is accompanied or followed by a reaction ([1959], p. 170).  
Indeed, Bunge’s third objection that interaction cannot handle processes where the 
antecedent ceases to exist, is only intelligible if one assumes that he does identify the reaction 
with the effect. Bunge uses an example of spontaneous decay of a micro-particle to illustrate 
his point, notably the conversion of a pion, into a muon with the emission of a neutrino:  
In this case, the parent particle (π) is unstable; it decays spontaneously (that is, without 
any known extrinsic cause, though presumably as a result of an inner process)[…]This is 
an irreversible, typically genetic process, the thing furthest from interaction–despite 
which meson theories usually treat this process as if it were a mutual action between 
coexistents. More exactly, the parent-child connection existing between the pion and its 
descendants is described as an interaction eliciting that very transition–despite the fact 
that the products are not yet born. ([1959], p. 163)  
If the muon and neutrino are ‘products’ of the decay of the pion, Bunge argues, then there 
cannot be talk of interaction between them and the pion. There cannot be an action by the pion 
on the products since they are ‘not yet born’, nor a reaction from the products on the ‘parent 
particle’ since it no longer exists. Note that Bunge does not object to the possibility of 
products reacting back on what produced them, but only to the possibility of such reaction in 
cases where the ‘producer’ ceases to exist in the process of producing the effect. I agree that 
the decay cannot be described as an interaction between the pion and its descendants, but for 
the simple reason that I do not think that interactions occur between the product and the 
producer.  
I think that the example is really a worse anomaly for the standard view, than it is for the 
interaction-view I present. If the decay is spontaneous, in the sense that there is no external 
cause to it, then it cannot be considered as a case of causation at all on the standard picture, 
because this picture defines causes as being external to the changing entity. On the standard 
view, if there is no external cause to the decay, and the possibility that the product of the 
decay reacts back on its own production is excluded, then we are dealing with a spontaneous 
event; an uncaused change. In that case the example really falls outside the category of 
phenomena being discussed, namely causal production. However, if the decay is a result of an 
inner process, as Bunge suggests, then it can possibly be treated as a product of an interaction 
between the parts of the unstable pion that become the muon and neutrino respectively. This 
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would however require that the pion be treated as a compound substance, which is an issue 
best left to physicists to answer. What matters here is, firstly, that Bunge identifies the 
reaction with the effect and therefore thinks that if the ‘agent’ ceases to exist in the process of 
producing the effect, then there is nothing for the effect to react back on. Secondly, he cannot 
see a process internal to the pion as being the cause to its decay, because he restricts the 
meaning of the term cause to ‘extrinsic motive agent’: 
Efficient causes are, by definition, extrinsic determinants[…] As understood in modern 
times, causal determinism asserts the universal operation of efficient causation. Now, by 
definition, of all kinds of cause, the efficient cause is the motive or active one‚ it is, 
moreover, an agent acting on things ab extrinseco and one that cannot act on itself. The 
efficient cause is, in short, an external compulsion‚ hence, an essential mark of (efficient) 
causation is externality ([1959], pp. 173-4).8 
It would seem as if the possibility of understanding the inner process of a pion as being the 
cause to its decay, require us to reject entirely the idea that efficient causation involves 
external compulsion, but I think this would be an exaggeration. Even on the interaction 
model, efficient causation involves external compulsion, namely the external and reciprocal 
compulsion that interacting things exert on each other. A brick is of course external to the 
window, and vice versa, but sometimes, an interaction may take place between the parts of a 
unity, producing the destruction of the unity. The interaction is then internal to the unity that 
is destroyed, but nevertheless involves external compulsion, namely the compulsion that the 
parts of the unity exert on each other. Interaction is not incompatible with the notion of 
external compulsion, it just does not identify the notion of ‘cause’ with external compulsion. 
Interaction requires that the notion of ‘cause’ as meaning the unique producer of a change, 
must be separated from the notion of external compulsion, because there cannot be a 
compulsion without a ‘countercompulsion’.  
Let us now turn to Bunge’s second objection, that interactions are often so asymmetrical 
that the reaction can be neglected. This objection is really an argument in favour of the 
standard picture, not an objection to interaction, i.e. it is a justification of the application of 
what Bunge calls the causal approximation. He makes a point of the fact that interacting 
things always affect each other mutually with equal force, but then points out that when there 
are large quantitative differences between the things, the larger thing will hardly be affected at 
all by the interaction. Bunge uses gravitation, which is both considered to be a paradigm of 
                                                
8 Bunge notes that external causes are insufficient to determine all kinds of changes, but he does 
not take it to imply that there is anything wrong with the thesis that causes are essentially external to 
the changing thing. Rather, he takes it to show that causality is but an approximation.  
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causality and thoroughly reciprocal, to illustrate his point: “Only if one of the masses is much 
smaller than the other (for example, a stone as compared with the whole Earth), can the 
greater mass be regarded as the cause of the acceleration of the smaller one, and the reaction 
of the latter’s motion be quantitatively neglected” ([1959], p. 150).9 That is, even though the 
interaction really is reciprocal, then sometimes the effect produced by the reaction is so small 
that it can be neglected, and the interaction be treated as being approximately causal in the 
standard sense. Bunge argues that “[i]n some cases this involves no error at all” ([1959], p. 
150). It is justified to ask: according to which standards is the reaction negligible? The answer 
is ‘in accordance with the explanatory interests of the observer’: “by a suitable choice of the 
reference system (change from laboratory system to center-of-mass system) [...] an interaction 
problem is thereby transformed into an ideal causal problem” ([1959], p. 151).10 That is, 
Bunge argues that when the effect on one of the things is for all practical purposes negligible, 
then we are methodologically justified to do the kind of aspect-shift that Maxwell described 
so well, i.e. sometimes we are justified to neglect those aspects of reality that we have no 
explanatory interest in.  
I will not argue that the application of the standard picture is not methodologically 
justified in many or most cases in scientific practice. I think Bunge does satisfactorily argue 
that it is so justified, as a useful approximation. But, the fact that interactions can always be 
approximated to fit the standard picture, by a suitable choice of which effect is to be 
neglected, is not an ontologically valid argument against interaction. There is clearly a tension 
between Bunge’s ontological and methodological considerations. He makes a point of the 
ontological inadequacy of the standard picture, regarding the relation between the action and 
reaction, but he prefers the standard picture, both for its methodological utility in cases where 
there is a large quantitative difference between the effects produced in an interaction, and 
because he thinks interaction does not involve production. I have no methodological 
considerations. I am looking for an ontologically adequate account of causal production, and I 
think, contrary to Bunge, that interaction does involve production.  
                                                
9 Note again, that Bunge does not distinguish clearly between reaction and  effect.  
10 Bengt Molander also considers briefly the suggestion that the standard conception of causality 
should be replaced by a conception based on interaction. He dismisses it with the motivation that 
explanations of what happens in a given system in terms of interaction does not make causal 
statements of the form ‘E because C’ about what happens in that system inappropriate or false ([1982], 
pp. 140-3). That is, it will still be true that the brick breaks the window, although at the same time the 
window causes the brick to  lose momentum. This is a motivation I find to be similar to Bunge’s 
reasoning. I would agree with them to the point that causal statements are not inappropriate or false as 
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Bunge’s fourth objection, that interaction does not involve production, is the most serious 
objection to interaction, but it is clear that it is directed against a completely different 
conception of interaction than the one I advocate, namely against the view that the relation 
between cause and effect, then meaning action and reaction, is symmetrical. In Bunge’s 
words: "Let us agree to call interactionism, or functionalism, the view according to which 
causes and effects must be treated on the same footing, in a symmetrical way excluding both 
predominant aspects and definitely genetic, hence irreversible, connections." ([1959], p. 162) 
This view, he claims, may be regarded as a "hasty extrapolation of the mechanical principle of 
the equality of the action and the reaction" ([1959], p. 162). Now, I agree that on my view 
there is not a relation of one-sided existential dependence between the action and reaction, 
rather a mutual dependence, but I take that to show that the reaction cannot really be an effect, 
and that the action alone cannot really be a cause. I do not take it to show that there is a 
symmetrical relation between cause and effect, rather I take it to show that we must re-
examine  the standard conception of ‘cause’. I suggest that by abandoning the idea that causes 
are essentially what Aristotle called the efficient cause, i.e. something external acting one-
sidedly on the changing entity, then it is possible to conceive of the interaction as a whole as 
the cause, and the change in the compound whole of interacting things as the effect. 
According to this view, the relation between action and reaction is symmetrical, but it does 
not follow from this that the relation between the interaction and the change it produces is 
symmetrical. Indeed I will argue that it is asymmetrical and that the interaction can therefore 
be considered to be the cause to the change. Bunge completely overlooks this possibility 
because he considers causes to be by definition external to the changing entity.  
It is not impossible to conceive of interactions as involving production, when one 
considers not the reaction as being the product, but the effects produced in the interacting 
things themselves by their own interaction. It is in fact difficult to conceive of interactions 
without thinking of them as the production of changes in the interacting things, when, as here, 
interaction refers to the mutual influence of two things upon each other. The notion of force 
has always been understood in terms of production of changes. Newton defined it as "an 
action exerted upon a body in order to change its state, either of rest or of uniform motion in a 
straight line" ([1953], p. 13), and Hertz defined it as "the independently conceived effect 
which one of two coupled systems[…]exerts upon the motion of the other" ([1956], p. 185). If 
                                                                                                                                                   
explanatory statements, in relation to what we want to explain. But it does make the individuation of 
causes and effects dependent on a subjective choice of reference. 
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force, meaning the action of one thing upon another, cannot be separated from the changes it 
produces, then neither can interaction be separated from the production of changes, since an 
interaction consists in two reciprocal forces. That the forces are reciprocal means that neither 
can exist without the other, and that, therefore, neither can produces the other. However, 
together they can produce a new state of affairs.  
P 3: Interaction involves production.  
I have so far argued that inanimate material objects cannot be objectively distinguished 
into ‘agents’ and ‘patient’, and thereby that the distinction between causes and effects in terms 
of ‘actions of an agent’ and ‘changes in a patient’, respectively, is ontologically inadequate. It 
involves a neglect of the reaction of the ‘patient’ and change produced in the ‘agent’.11 The 
causal production of a state of affairs involves the interaction of things, and this interaction is 
reciprocal.12 That is, in explaining the causal relation between events, there is always a story 
to be told about the interaction between the things involved.  
I do not deny that we often experience interactions as being asymmetrical, but I suggest 
that this experience of asymmetry is purely subjective. It does appear to be more ‘fatal’ for a 
window to be smashed to smithereens than for a brick to lose momentum. But, surely, the 
sense in which the breaking, or destruction of objects in general, is ‘fatal’, is a subjective 
evaluation. Is it perhaps because a smashed window is inconvenient to a house-owner in a 
way that the loss of momentum by a brick is not, that we attend to the breaking of the window 
as an ‘important’ effect of the interaction, while the loss of momentum by the brick is a 
                                                
11 Someone may find my talk of causes and effects in terms of the action of ‘agents’ and changes 
in ‘patients’ ill fitted to contemporary discussions about causality, where causes are usually formulated 
in terms of conditions of various sorts. I chose this terminology to avoid confusion with accounts of 
causality where production has no place. But, I take it that the basic idea behind the polarisation of 
interacting entities into ‘agents’ and ‘patients’, has affinity with the idea behind distinguishing 
between conditions that are merely necessary, and conditions that are both necessary and sufficient. 
The idea is that there is some special part of a given state of affairs, whether that part is an object or 
event, which has an especially important function in the production (or determination) of a subsequent 
state of affairs. I argue that this idea is mistaken. It may anyhow be pointed out that in terms of 
conditions, my account comes closest to being compatible with Mackie’s analysis of causes in terms 
of insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is unnecessary but uniquely sufficient for the 
effect (INUS condition) [1965]. Except, because I think of effects in terms of tokens, not types, and of 
the genetic link between cause and effect as grounding the necessity of the connection, then I think the 
‘action’ and ‘reaction’ are each an insufficient but necessary part of an interaction which is necessary 
and uniquely sufficient for the effect (let me call that an INNS-condition).  
12 I am here using ‘state of affairs’ as the unity of a substance with properties, whether or not the 
substance is a compound or a simple, and whether or not the compound is an aggregate or unity of 
substances. For reference, see I. Johansson [1989], Ch. 3. For a recent discussion of the ontology of 
states of affairs, see E. Runggaldier & C. Kanzian [1998] pp. 198-218. 
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negligible ‘side-effect’? If this is the reason, and I think it is, then the experienced asymmetry 
of the interaction is purely subjective, i.e. dependent on our explanatory interests.  
To be sure, different things change in different ways when entering into interactions, and 
these differences can be quite dramatic, but does not justify giving one of the interacting 
things, e.g. ‘the flying brick’, the privilege of being the sole producer of the subsequent 
change, e.g. that the window breaks and that the brick loses momentum and velocity. The 
objective character of the subsequent state of affairs as a whole is determined jointly, and 
reciprocally, by all the things involved. I suggest the difference in how things change in 
interactions is due to differences in the intrinsic properties of the things themselves, not to 
asymmetry between the influences they are subject to. Different things change differently 
when they interact, because they are different, not because of an asymmetry between their 
respective actions. 
If it is correct that causal production always involves interaction between coexisting 
things, then it follows that interaction is ontologically prior to the cause-effect relation 
believed to hold between temporally distinct events. I think this is something we can observe 
in our everyday practices, when we reflect upon it. We know we cannot accomplish anything 
without acting upon things in some way or another, and we always feel their resistance 
(reaction) when we do. We always  suffer a change ourselves when accomplishing a change  
in something else, but as long as this change is negligible to our purposes, then it will go by 
unnoticed. It is indeed because we feel the resistance of the things we interact with, that we 
can adjust the effort we make to their resistance. Our effort is always proportional to their 
resistance. We also know we value different consequences of interactions in various ways, 
indeed, different people value the same consequences differently, and we know that the 
mechanical forces involved have little or nothing to do with their value. A tiny little push on 
the edge of a cliff can have dramatic consequences, while a full body tackle in the ice-hockey 
rink does not matter a jot. We even disagree on what is to be considered as the ‘agent’, i.e. the 
efficient cause, e.g. in deciding questions of responsibility. That interactions are thoroughly 
reciprocal, is maybe not intuitively given at first glance, especially when it comes to 
intentional acts, but I think it is convincing on second reflection in light of everything that has 
been said.13  
                                                
13 Perhaps intentional beings could in some sense be examples of ‘extrinsic motive agents’, in 
accordance with the standard picture. That is, I am prepared to leave it open whether individuals with 
the capacity to a) perceive themselves in relation to other objects, b) have preferences and desires, c) 
predict various consequences of various actions before they are performed, d) choose the action that is 
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P 4: Interaction between coexisting objects is ontologically prior to the one-sided 
existential dependence relation between two temporally distinct events. 
Now, in what sense can a state of affairs produced by an interaction be necessarily 
connected to the interaction that produced it? Perhaps it is possible to argue that if the 
character of the interaction is entirely determined by the properties of the interacting things, 
then the outcome of that interaction is entirely determined by the interaction. On the 
assumption that properties are universals, then whenever two objects of a certain kind interact 
in a certain way, the very same kind of effect is always produced. We would then have, in 
principle, constant and invariable type-type relations, i.e. a necessary connection. I will 
however argue that there is another kind of necessary connection to be found, a genetic token-
token link.  
Assuming, as I do, what appears to be an empirical fact, that nothing can be produced ex 
nihilo, then we must consider out of what a new state of affairs is produced. A potter cannot 
produce pots without clay, factories need raw material out of which they can produce ready 
products. Without raw material that can be altered into a new shape, nothing can be produced. 
What is the raw material out of which a new state of affairs is produced, and where does it 
come from? I propose that a new state of affairs is produced by the interaction of things, out 
of the very substance those interacting things are made of, i.e. the state which is produced is 
made of the same substances as were involved in the interaction. It is the same substance that 
constitutes a window and then a pile of broken glass. It is the same brick that comes flying 
through the air and then lies in that very pile of broken glass.  
Since interaction requires at least two things, then the production of a new state of affairs 
requires an aggregate of things or substances, and we can speak of that aggregate as a 
compound substance. If the state of affairs produced by the interaction is produced out of the 
substance of the interacting things, then the state of affairs produced by an interaction consist 
in the very same compound substance as were engaged in the interaction. On this account, the 
relationship between two different but in this sense causally related states of affairs is 
                                                                                                                                                   
perceived to lead to a desired effect, e) adjust the effort and direction of the action to the reaction of 
other objects, may perhaps be capable of initiating actions, and not just interact with the environment 
in the sense described above. This list of capacities is not complete, nor do the distinctions aim to 
represent logically, or otherwise, independent capacities, but rather interdependent capacities. I just 
want to make a sharp distinction between how we calculate, and perhaps initiate, our actions in the 
world, and how physical objects in general actually interact in the course of real events. To what 
extent intentional actions differ from interactions is beyond the scope of this paper, but I do think our 
cognitive abilities biases our understanding of the nature of causal production in the world of 
inanimate material objects. For a recent overview on the topic of mental causation, see Loewer [1998]. 
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necessary in the sense that they are necessarily constituted by the very same compound 
substance. Causally produced change is then an alteration in the state of a compound 
substance, brought about by that very substance itself, through the interaction of its aggregate 
parts. This brings another feature of change into focus, namely that every production of a state 
of affairs is always at the same time a destruction of an existent state of affairs. The coming 
into existence of a state of affairs, that does not come into existence out of a state that is 
destroyed, must be creation ex nihilo. 
P 5: Two causally related states of affairs are necessarily constituted by the very same 
compound substance. 
It might be objected that I am here assuming without argument an endurance view of the 
persistence of things, as opposed to a perduring view of persistence, but this would be 
mistaken. That things persist by enduring, as opposed to perduring, is a conclusion of my 
argument, from the initial premise that causality does in fact involve production. It seems to 
me that this premise is only compatible with endurance.14 If it were assumed that things 
persist by having temporal parts, each part being a distinct and independent substantial entity, 
i.e. by perduring, then I fail to see what could be produced, by what, and out of what.15 If one 
temporal part of a thing is broken and an earlier part is whole, without the part being whole 
having changed into being broken, then out of what was the broken part produced? The 
broken part must either (i) always have existed, in which case it was not produced, (ii) be 
produced by being brought into reality from outside reality, (iii) be produced out of the 
substance of the ‘agent’, in which case a brick would have to be able to change into a pile of 
glass and the problem would shift to the production of the brick lying in the pile of glass, or 
(iv) be produced ex nihilo. Indeed most perdurantist would agree and say that since things 
perdure, there is no production, everything simply exists, albeit at different times. I want to 
make as good sense as I can of the idea that causality involves production, but reject the 
possibility of creation ex nihilo, and will then have to conclude that if causality involves 
production then substances persist by enduring.16 
                                                
14 I have elsewhere argued in greater detail that the notion of causal production requires endurance 
[2001].  
15 Like Haslanger [1989], I have argued that the perdurantist position commits to a Humean 
interpretation of causality, i.e. to a correlation view of causality, in which production has no place 
[2001].  
16 It is widely argued that change per se, not just causally produced change, necessarily requires 
endurance of the substances involved. For reference see, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk. XII, Ch. 2, 
Haslanger [1989], and Lowe [1998]. 
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If one is forced to assume that substances persist by enduring, one is arguably also forced 
to assume that time is tensed. The idea that substances endure through a succession of 
incompatible states, requires that substances may exists in just one state at a time, and, 
objectively speaking, cease to exist in the state they change from, when they change into 
another state. That is, in order for an entity to cease to be in a state and begin to be in another, 
objectively speaking, that entity must be ‘wholly present’ at many times in succession, i.e. be 
at present in one state but in another state in the future. This is a possibility that is denied by 
the so-called tenseless view of time, which claims that all moments of time are equally 
existent and real. On the tenseless view, things just appear to exist at different times in 
succession, when in fact they are at all times equally existent and real at all the times they 
exist. This view, it is argued, is only compatible with the view that things perdure, i.e. exist at 
various times by having different temporal parts located at those various times.17  
Two states of affairs that are causally related, in the sense given above, will be different 
states of the very same compound substance, which has changed from one state to the other 
due to the interaction of its parts. The production of changes cannot then really be construed 
as involving an external influence on the changing entity (although the parts of that entity act 
mutually and externally on each other), but to influences internal to a changing compound, or 
aggregate of substances. That is, on this account, causally produced change is always a 
change within a system. 
P 6: Causally produced change is always internal to a compound substance.  
If causation is the production of a change in an aggregate by the interaction between the 
coexistent parts of that aggregate, that interaction being considered as the cause to the change, 
it follows trivially that causes are existentially prior to their effects. The causal production of 
a new state of affairs, presupposes the existence of an aggregate whose parts interact. On the 
further assumption that time is tensed, it follows trivially that interactions always precede 
their effects in time. 
P 7: Interactions always precede their effects in time. 
                                                
17 In [2001], I argue that endurance, tensed time and causal production are essentially linked to one 
another in what I call the dynamic view of reality, while perdurance, tenseless time and the correlation 
view of causality essentially belong together in what I call the static view of reality. In that paper I also 
argue that what has hitherto been considered the most serious objection to the dynamic view, the 
charge that tensed change in enduring entities is contradictory, is invalid because circular. 
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I must stress that this is an account of causal change that is completely independent of the 
particular qualitative character of the states of the compound substance before and after the 
interaction. Surely, what happens in an interaction is determined by the properties of the 
substances involved, and the way they interact, but my account does not depend on it being 
the case that any two interactions are exactly alike; my account is compatible with the 
possibility that every single interaction in the history of the universe is unique. It is also 
compatible with the possibility that there are general laws, it just does not give a criterion that 
can be used to identify types of effects that are always and invariably produced by certain 
types of interactions; that, I think, is a task for empirical science.  
I have said that I will not defend the reality of causal production against those who deny 
its reality, and I will not. But, I will point out what I think is an interesting contrast between 
Hume’s account of causality and mine. According to Hume, the objective components of the 
causal nexus are three: contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction. I have argued that 
there is also reciprocity between the contiguous objects. I have no qualms with Hume’s view 
that there is no logical necessity in the conjunction of the motion of a billiard ball A and 
subsequent motion of a billiard ball B, when A and B collide. We are free to think of the 
collision of A and B as being succeeded by anything whatsoever. We can conceive of A 
approaching B, and their contact resulting in a third ball C (or whatever object you like) 
emerging from B. We can even think of ball A simply passing through ball B, without 
anything happening to B or to A. What we cannot do, or will not do, I submit, is to think of the 
passing by A through B as being a case of causation, however many times this type of event 
recurs. Rather, we would think of it as the absence of causality, because, I suggest, it 
completely lacks any sign of reciprocity. The appearance of reciprocity is present in every 
instance of causation in the realm of ordinary middle-sized objects. Whether this appearance 
of reciprocity is explained in terms of production or not, any adequate account of causation 
will have to be able to account for it.  
Now there remains to describe the relation between the state destroyed in an interaction 
and the state produced by that very same interaction. Strictly speaking it is the interaction 
between the parts of the compound substance that produces a change in the compound from 
one state to another, the states themselves are always products. That is, the interaction is the 
process in which the effect is produced. But, I suggest that the relation between any state from 
which the compound substance changes and the state to which it changes, due to the 
interaction, nevertheless be characterised as being one of producer to product. Any given state 
of a substance, although merely a temporary form of the substance, cannot be separated from 
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the substance itself. The state cannot exist without the substance. If, as I have argued, the state 
to which the compound substance changes, is necessarily constituted by the very same 
substance as the state from which it changes, then the state to which the compound changes is 
for its existence dependent on the state from which the compound changes, because the state 
to which it changes ‘inherits’ both the substance, and the character, from the state the 
compound changes from.  
The temporally distinct states of any such compound, related as producer to product 
through the interactions of the parts of the compound, will then hold a relation of one-sided 
existential dependence; the state to which a compound substance changes is for its existence 
dependent upon the state from which the compound changes, but the state from which it 
changes is not for its existence dependent upon the state to which it changes. That is, on my 
account, the so-called causal asymmetry between a cause and an effect, i.e. why it does not 
follow from ‘x caused y’, that ‘y caused x’, can be given in the following terms: if x produced 
y, y could not have produced x, because that would have required y to produce x prior to its 
own production, which is impossible.18  
P 8: The state produced by an interaction stands in a relation of one-sided existential 
dependence to the state destroyed by that very same interaction. 
5. CONCLUSION  
When the asymmetric relation between ‘agent’ and ‘patient’ is abandoned, and causal 
production of changes is taken to be the result of reciprocal action between parts of an 
aggregate (or system), a relation of one-sided existential dependence can be found to hold 
                                                
18 I think this is a good time to point out a significant difference between my view and the 
perspectival view advocated by Huw Price [1996], who also argues that the standard picture of 
causality is biased by agency. I argue that the relation between interacting entities should be 
considered to be symmetrical, but the relation between the interaction and the state it produces as 
asymmetrical. Price argues that the relation between earlier and later stages of a process hold a 
symmetrical relation, i.e. he argues that the state which a system appears to have changed from, and 
the state which it appears to have changed to, when its parts interact, really hold a symmetrical 
relation. Price’s argument is based on the fact that the mathematical formulations of the laws of nature 
in physics are time invariant. That is, because it makes no difference to exchange the time variable t, 
with its contrary -t, in the fundamental laws of physics, any process can be described as going either 
backwards or forwards in time, without violating those laws. Perhaps accounts of causality that rely 
only on the aspects of lawful connections between types of events in accordance with the laws of 
physics, will have to accept Price’s conclusion, but then, I think, those accounts are incompatible with 
the conception of causality as involving production. If the relation between two states of one and the 
same system is symmetrical, neither could have produced the other. Admittedly, the genetic principle 
imposes no special direction to certain types of processes, but it excludes that the relation between two 
token stages of one and the same causal process is symmetric.  
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between the state produced in the aggregate by the interaction of its own parts, and the state 
destroyed by that same interaction. In other words, the interaction between the parts of a 
compound substances, destroys a state of affairs at the same time as it produces a new state of 
affairs, the produced state of affairs being for its existence one-sidedly dependent upon the 
state that was destroyed.  
Thus conceived, the two states of affairs may be logically independent, in terms of being 
of a certain type each, but they cannot be thought to be made of distinct and independent 
substances. If it is assumed that they are distinct compound substances, then the question out 
of what they are produced is left unanswered, or it is answered that they were not at all 
produced, or it is answered that this effect was at least not produced by this cause. I suggest 
that in order to explain production of changes, and the existential dependence relation 
between the change and what produced the change, it is necessary to assume that things, or 
the substance they are made of, persist by enduring. Conversely it means that if endurance is 
abandoned, production must be abandoned too. Also, if endurance requires time to be tensed, 
and production requires endurance, then production requires tensed time.  
When cause and effect are seen to be made of the same substance, it is impossible to think 
that any particular effect could just as well have been produced by some other cause than it in 
fact was. Any attempt to think of the effect as having been produced by some other cause, will 
necessarily involve thinking of it as having been produced out of some altogether different 
substance, and therefore as being a totally different effect. It is of course possible to think that 
a certain type of effect could have been produced by a number of different types of causes, or 
by different token causes of the same type, but not that a particular token effect could have 
been produced by any other token cause than it in fact was.  
I hope I have made a good case for the claims that interaction, as I have described it (i) 
can be conceived to involve production, (ii) involves a necessary connection between an 
interaction and its product, and (iii) should be taken seriously as a possible hypothesis of the 
factual nature of causality. It is an hypothesis that fits the components of the common notion 
of causality, i.e. that causality involves production due to causal influence such that the 
producer and product hold a relation of one-sided existential dependence, although it 
combines these components in a somewhat different way than is usual. It also fits certain 
widely accepted metaphysical principles, i.e. the genetic principle and the principle of 
lawfulness, but requires that the principle of action be substituted for what may be called the 
principle of reciprocity. This, I believe is however only a minor modification, and which 
serves to correct the agency bias of the standard picture. My final suggestion is thus: 
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P 9: Interaction and necessary causal production is the same process    
In short, my suggestion is that causally produced change is properly described in terms of 
changes in the state of a compound substance, produced by the interaction between the parts 
of that substance itself, i.e. that causally produced change is always due to influences internal 
to the changing entity. Causally related states of affairs are thus different states of the very 
same substance, one coming to exist out of the other, and that is, I suggest, the kernel of truth 
behind all talk of a necessary connection between causally related events.19 
REFERENCES: 
ALBERT, D.Z. [1992], Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Massachusetts.  
ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. [1971], ‘Causality and Determination’, in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. 
(eds.), Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 88-104, 1993. 
ARISTOTLE, ‘Metaphysics’,  in Aristotle, vol.  XVIII, translated by Tredennick. H., Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachussetss, 1935. 
– ‘Physics’, in Aristotle vol. IV, translated by Wickstead, P.H., & Cornford, F.M., Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachussetts, 1957. 
ARMSTRONG, D.M. [1983], What is a Law of Nature, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
BUNGE, M. [1959], Causality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. 
COLLINGWOOD, R.G. [1940], An Essay in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
FALES, E. [1990], Causation and Universals, Routledge, London. 
GASKING, D. [1955], ‘Causation and Recipes’, Mind 64, 479-87. 
GINSBERG, E. [1931], ‘On the Concepts of Existential Dependence and Independence’, with 
an introduction by Simons, P., in Smith, B. (ed.), Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic 
and Formal Ontology, Philosophia Verlag, München, pp. 261-287, 1982. 
HASLANGER, S. [1989], ‘Persistence, Change, and Explanation’, Philosophical Studies 56, 
1-28. 
HERTZ, H. [1956], The Principles of Mechanics, Dover Publications, Inc., New York. 
INGTHORSSON, R. [2001], ‘Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change’, Sats-Nordic 
Journal of Philosophy 2(2), 60-79. 
JOHANSSON, I. [1989], Ontological Investigations, Routledge, London. 
LOEWER, B. [1998], ‘Mental Causation’, in Craig, E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy Vol. 6, Routledge, London, pp. 307-11. 
LOWE, E.J. [1998], The Possibility of Metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
MACKIE, J. [1965], ‘Causes and Conditions’, in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds.), Causation, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 33-55, 1993.  
MAXWELL, J.C. [1877], Matter and Motion, Dover, New York. 
                                                
19 I would like to thank Phil Dowe, Jan Faye, Ingvar Johansson, E.J. Lowe, Jeff Malpas, Johannes 
Persson, and three anonymous referees, for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and those 
parts of it presented at the Copenhagen Colloquium on Backwards Causation and Time, in december 
1999.  
 
From Metaphysica 3(1): 87-119, 2002.  
 27 
MOLANDER, B. [1982], The Order there Is, and the Order We Make, Philosophical Studies 
No. 35, Philosophical Society and the Department of Philosophy, University of Uppsala, 
Uppsala. 
NEWTON, I. [1686], ‘Definitions and Scholium’, in Newton’s Philosophy of Nature, Thayer. 
H.S. (ed.), Hafner Press, New York, 1953. 
PRICE, H. [1996], Time’s Arrow and Archimedes Point, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
RAMSEY, F.P. [1929], ‘General Propositions and Causality’, in Ramsey, F.P., Philosophical 
Papers, Mellor, D.H. (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 145-6, 1990. 
RUNGGALDIER, E., & KANZIAN, C. [1998], Grundprobleme der Analytischen Ontologie, 
Schöningh, Paderborn.  
SALMON, W. [1980], ‘Causality: Production and Propagation’, in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. 
(eds.), Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 154-71. 
– [1984], Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey. 
SOSA, E., & TOOLEY, [1993], M, ‘Introduction’, in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds.), 
Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993. 
WEIDNER, R.T., & SELLS, R.L. [1968], Elementary Modern Physics 2nd ed., Allyn & 
Bacon Inc, Boston. 
VON WRIGHT [1974], G.H., Causality and Determinism, New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
